A joint economic lot size model with financial collaboration and uncertain investment opportunity by Marchi, B. et al.
              
City, University of London Institutional Repository
Citation: Marchi, B., Ries, J.M., Zanoni, S. & Glock, C.H. (2016). A joint economic lot size 
model with financial collaboration and uncertain investment opportunity. International Journal 
of Production Economics, 176, pp. 170-182. doi: 10.1016/j.ijpe.2016.02.021 
This is the accepted version of the paper. 
This version of the publication may differ from the final published 
version. 
Permanent repository link:  http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/17119/
Link to published version: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijpe.2016.02.021
Copyright and reuse: City Research Online aims to make research 
outputs of City, University of London available to a wider audience. 
Copyright and Moral Rights remain with the author(s) and/or copyright 
holders. URLs from City Research Online may be freely distributed and 
linked to.
City Research Online:            http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/            publications@city.ac.uk
City Research Online
1 
 
A joint economic lot size model with financial credits and uncertain investment 
opportunity 
  
Beatrice Marchi 
Department of Mechanical and Industrial Engineering, Università degli Studi di Brescia 
(b.marchi@unibs.it) 
Jörg M. Ries 
Department of Law and Economics, Technische Universität Darmstadt 
(ries@pscm.tu-darmstadt.de) 
Simone Zanoni 
Department of Mechanical and Industrial Engineering, Università degli Studi di Brescia 
(simone.zanoni@unibs.it) 
Christoph H. Glock 
Department of Law and Economics, Technische Universität Darmstadt 
(glock@pscm.tu-darmstadt.de) 
 
Abstract: Establishing long-term relationships among the members of a supply chain has 
become necessary to enhance the supply chain’s competitiveness in a globalized environment. 
Besides coordinating operational decisions, such as how much and when to produce or to 
order, the members of a supply chain may also share financial resources or act jointly on the 
capital market. This is important especially when companies have unequal access to capital, 
for example because they are located in countries with different economic conditions and 
banking policies and/or ratings. The joint financing of investments across the supply chain 
may thus ensure the stability of production and of the flow of products to the customers. In 
addition, it strengthens the established relationships among the supply chain members. This 
study takes up these issues and presents an integrated inventory model that considers 
investments jointly financed by the members of a supply chain. In particular, it considers a 
two-stage supply chain with a single vendor and a single buyer and assumes that the vendor 
has the option to invest in increasing its production rate. The buyer, however, is assumed to 
have better access to capital, and therefore has the option to give a credit to the vendor to 
invest in its productivity, which is beneficial for both parties. To consider uncertainties of the 
production improvement investments, a success probability for the investment is considered 
and modeled using a beta distribution. 
 
Keywords: Integrated inventory, supplier credits, variable production rate, uncertain 
investment, annuity stream approach. 
 
Introduction 
Coordinating strategic and operational decisions among the different echelons of a supply 
chain is a prerequisite for creating and maintaining competitive advantages in today’s 
business environment. Supply chain management therefore encompasses the coordination of 
material, financial and information flows in supply chains, and has recently received 
increased attention both in theory and in practice (Mentzer et al., 2001; Li et al., 2006). One 
stream of supply chain management research that enjoyed increased popularity in recent 
years studies the coordination of order and production quantities in supply chains. So-called 
joint economic lot size (JELS) models determine continuous inventory policies from a 
system’s point of view that maximize the profit of the entire supply chain instead of 
optimizing the positions of individual supply chain members. 
 
 2 
Despite the coordination of material movements, supply chain management also focuses on 
the coordination of financial flows along the stages of a supply chain (Mentzer et al., 2001, 
Wuttke, et al., 2013). Surprisingly, the focus of prior research on the coordination of supply 
chains has mainly been on material flows, and only little attention has been paid to the impact 
a financial coordination may have on the supply chains performance.  In a scenario of general 
economic crisis, however, an innovative opportunity is given by Supply Chain Finance (SCF) 
services and solutions, which enable a company to improve its financial performance by 
leveraging on the relationships and dynamics of its supply chain. As it is underlined in 
Hofmann (2005), SCF focuses on financial aspects and instruments, which might apply to 
any department of an organization. Moreover, in the above reference, SCF is defined as “an 
approach for two or more organizations in a supply chain, including external service 
providers, to jointly create value through means of planning, steering, and controlling the 
flow of financial resources on an inter-organizational level”.  
According to Buzacott and Zhang (2004), the main alternatives of financing are: (i) increase 
payables; (ii) decrease receivables, for example by selling receivables to a third party that 
pays the firm immediately and collects payments from customers; (iii) increase gross profit; 
(iv) increase equity; and (v) borrowing. For SMEs, however, it was shown that the best way 
of financing is borrowing, in particular with asset-based loans (i.e., loans secured on 
inventories and receivables). The reason is that SMEs lack market power, have limited 
resources, may not have good credit ratings and, finally, are not always able to compete on 
price in the market. These results are also supported by a recent survey of the European 
Central Bank (ECB, 2014) which shows that for many companies and especially for SMEs, 
getting access to capital is an even more pressing problem than finding customers. Further 
conclusions that can be drawn from this survey are: (i) SMEs reported a marginal decrease in 
the perceived availability of bank loans in spite of the fact that their funding highly depends 
on them, (ii) interest rates offered to SMEs increased over recent years, and (iii) financing 
conditions for SMEs are in general more difficult than those for larger companies and 
continue to differ significantly across European countries – for example, in the last years, the 
average interest rates for SMEs in Italy was much higher than the one in Germany, and the 
existing gap is still growing. 
The reduction in the availability of loans, which is often referred to as ‘credit crunch’, heavily 
influences the current world economic scenario. A detailed review of the difficulties SMEs 
face in financing and on credit crunch issues is presented in Wehinger (2014). A credit 
crunch may lead to strong asymmetries among the supply chain parties and therefore should 
be carefully addressed to ensure the competitiveness of the whole supply chain (Hale and 
Arteta, 2009). For example, financially distressed suppliers, who may end up in bankruptcy, 
pose significant operational risks to manufacturers. Manufacturers may be able to switch 
suppliers in the event of a default, but in an environment where many suppliers are 
financially distressed and where only a few qualified suppliers are available, the number of 
alternative suppliers decreases significantly. In addition, supplier diversification is expensive 
especially for non-commodity products. In such a situation, the only remaining option for 
manufacturers, in order to support the weaker supplier, are subsidies. These subsidies can 
take the form of cash, agreements for future contracts, or they can be targeted towards 
supplier development.  
 
To address this issue, this paper considers the case where a manufacturer offers a credit to its 
supplier to improve the supplier’s production performance (cf., for example, Wadecki, et al., 
2012). The credit offered by the manufacturer has the purpose to develop the supplier by 
improving the supplier’s capabilities and subsequently its performance (Krause, 1997). One 
way to improve the performance of a company or the entire supply chain is to invest in the 
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production capacity either by capital-intensive, physical investments (e.g., factories, 
machines, equipment, etc.), or by investments in intangible assets (e.g., lean production, 
training, know-how, knowledge etc.). In this paper, we consider an asset-specific investment 
(i.e. an investment tailored specifically towards the buyer-supplier-relationship), where the 
invested capital cannot be easily reallocated for another purpose, which increases the 
investment risk as there are limited recovery values in case of an investment default. 
Under these circumstances, lenders pay particular attention to investment performance, and 
the modeling effort requires considerable accuracy (Borgonovo, et al., 2010). Ojala and 
Hallikas (2006) provided insights into investment decision-making under uncertainty and 
risks in buyer-dominated supply networks, where ‘risk’ refers to the  possiblility of a landee 
not paying its loan on time or not paying it at all. The latter is usually referred to as ‘credit 
default’. The authors also underlined that one key element of an investment is that its 
outcome is uncertain. Their study leads to the following conclusion (Ojala and Hallikas, 2006, 
p. 209): “awareness of the potential investment risks and the firm’s position and role in the 
network is essential to be able to make rational investment decisions, also from the point of 
view of the whole network”. Clearly, in a formal model that aims on supporting investment 
decisions, it is important to model the risk of an investment, as it affects the investment 
decision. Before the investment is made, the outcome is uncertain: the investment could be a 
complete success, a complete failure, or it could achieve an intermediate outcome. To model 
the investment risk, this paper assumes that the investment has a continuous probability of 
success that follows a beta distribution. The probability distribution represents the stochastic 
result of the investment and its uncertainty. The beta probability density function has been 
chosen because it is very flexible and can model a large variety of heterogeneity patterns 
(Dolgui and Pashkevich, 2008; Ospina and Ferrari, 2012). 
This paper consequently extends the classical JELS model to account for uncertain 
investment opportunities and joint investment decisions. The remainder of this paper is 
organized as follows: Section 2 gives an overview of the existing literature, and Section 3 
introduces the notations and assumptions used and presents mathematical models for 
different coordination scenarios. Section 4 provides numerical examples to illustrate the 
proposed models. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper by summarizing its main findings 
and by providing suggestions for future research. 
 
Literature Review 
Joint economic lot size models are an important modeling reference for supply chain 
management and have been studied extensively in the past. Early research in this area 
focused on the coordination of order and production cycles by assuming that the production 
and order quantities have to be equal, or by assuming that the supplier may produce an 
integer number of orders in a single production run (e.g., Goyal, 1977; Banerjee, 1986). 
Subsequently, researchers focused on managing transportation processes between the supplier 
and the buyer, for example by assuming that production lots may be split up into equal- 
and/or unequal-sized shipments, or that some type of constraint on the shipments has to be 
considered (e.g., Agrawal and Raju, 1996; Hill, 1999; Ertogral et al., 2007; Glock, 2012a). 
Recent works on the JELS problem focused on the management of containers in supply 
chains (e.g., Kim et al., 2014; Glock and Kim, 2014), environmental issues (e.g., Jaber et al., 
2014), or human learning in production (e.g., Khan et al., 2014). Readers may refer to the 
works of Glock (2012b) and Glock et al. (2014) for recent reviews. 
Many manufacturing firms today recognize the impact of their suppliers’ performance on 
their own. This has made purchasing an active research area, with supplier development 
being central to improving supply chain performance. Friedl and Wagner (2012), for example, 
studied a firm’s decision of whether to invest in an incumbent supplier or to switch to an 
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alternative supplier in order to minimize the total costs of purchasing a product. Their work 
indicated that the development of an incumbent supplier (i.e. a cooperative investment) 
becomes more attractive when the purchase price of an item on the market is high and 
uncertain, as compared to what the incumbent supplier can offer. Two other relevant works 
on supplier development are those of Meisel (2012), who developed a decision support model 
for supplier selection and supplier development in dynamic markets, and Ries et al. (2013), 
who studied integrated inventory and financing decisions in supply chains. Talluri et al. 
(2010) noted that formal decision models have very rarely been developed in this field in the 
past. The authors provided a decision support system to allocate an investment of a company 
to its suppliers, such that a target return is achieved at a minimum risk. Recent reviews of 
works on supplier development are those of Chidambaranathan et al. (2009) and Wagner 
(2011), who showed that the majority of works on supplier development presented empirical 
studies based on surveys. 
Another stream of research that is relevant for this paper studies investments into process 
improvements and/or variable production rates. Process improvement investments were first 
studied by Porteus (1985), who developed an order quantity model where setup costs are 
variable and dependent on the investment volume. The author showed that investments lead 
to lower total costs. Investments into the production rate were considered by Buzacott and 
Ozkarahan (1983), who assumed that production rates in a scheduling problem are variable, 
and that a changeover cost occurs when varying the production rate. Eiamkanchanalai and 
Banerjee (1999) developed a model for determining the optimal run time and production rate 
for a single item. They assumed that the unit production cost is a quadratic function of the 
production rate. Recently, Glock (2010, 2011) studied the impact of variable production rates 
on the inventory build-up and the total cost of two- and multi-stage production systems. He 
showed that considering variable production rates in a production system could reduce 
excessive inventory in the system. Zanoni et al. (2014) finally considered the case where the 
production rate influences energy consumption in production, and studied which production 
rate should be selected to minimize the total costs of the production process. 
 
Finally, as the investments concern a long period of time, it is crucial to consider the temporal 
allocation of payments, and thus research on the net present value (NPV) approach is of 
relevance to this paper. Even though the NPV approach is widely accepted as a suitable 
framework for studying production and inventory control systems, average cost (AC) models 
have been used more frequently in the literature. Several authors (e.g., Hadley, 1964; Trippi 
and Lewin, 1974; Klein Haneveld and Teunter, 1998) have argued that for the EOQ model, 
an AC framework is an approximation of the NPV framework resulting in near-optimal 
solutions if the following conditions are met: a) products are not moving slowly, b) interest 
rates are not high, and c) the customer payment structure does not depend on the inventory 
policy. The main objections against using the AC approach as an approximation of the NPV 
are: a) the time value of money is not explicitly taken into account, b) there is no distinction 
between out-of-pocket holding costs and opportunity costs of inventory investment, and other 
sources of opportunity costs/yields (e.g., fixed ordering costs, product sales) are not taken 
into account at all, and c) initial conditions are not taken into consideration. However, the 
NPV approach is often rather complicated, such that an approximation may still be preferred. 
In the past, it has been shown that a certain transformation of the holding cost parameters in 
EOQ-type models gives near-optimal results for the NPV approach as well, e.g. the annuity 
stream approach (AS). Some of the most interesting works on the discounted cash flow 
approach are those of Grubbström (1980), van der Laan and Teunter (2002) and Beullens and 
Janssens (2014). 
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Model development 
Problem description 
This paper is concerned with the coordination of inventory and financing decisions in a two-
stage single-vendor-single-buyer supply chain. As the advantage of centralized decision-
making has repeatedly been demonstrated in the literature on the joint economic lot size 
problem (for a detailed and recent review, see Glock, 2012b), the present work considers only 
centralized scenarios and assumes that the vendor and the buyer act jointly to maximize the 
total profit of the supply chain. 
 
Replenishments are assumed to follow an equal-sized shipment policy in this paper, as shown 
in Figure 1. The buyer orders a lot of size Q at regular time intervals and the vendor 
manufactures a lot of size nQ at a finite production rate P with a single setup that is delivered 
to the buyer in n shipments of equal size Q. The vendor incurs a setup cost for each 
production run, and the buyer incurs an ordering cost for each order placed. 
 
Beside these operational characteristics, it is assumed that the buyer – for different reasons 
(e.g., larger dimension, a different country of origin, a different financial rating, etc.) – is in a 
better financial position in terms of liquidity and solvency than the vendor, and thus has 
access to capital at a lower interest rate than its rather small vendor. As noted by Fazzari et al. 
(1988), in an environment with information asymmetries, external funds may be more costly 
than internal capital, and they may thus provide an imperfect substitute for it. A possible way 
to reduce this cost and to overcome credit crunch is to close agreements with a partner that is 
in a better financial position, with revenue sharing as an alternative mechanisms (see Lee and 
Rhee, 2010). As a result, the buyer could engage in supplier development initiatives through 
direct investments by lending money to the vendor that may be invested to increase its 
production rate. The increase of the production rate at the vendor is assumed to result in a 
decrease of the unit production cost. Moreover, the demand at the buyer’s side is linked to the 
selling price, such that there is an indirect relationship between the production rate at the 
vendor and the demand at the buyer. The investment considered in this paper is assumed to 
be uncertain, and the probability of success for the investment is modelled using a beta 
distribution. 
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Figure 1: Inventory level and payment structure 
 
While considering investment decisions, the timing of incoming and outgoing payments has a 
considerable impact on the profitability of the investment and on production decisions. 
Whereas decisions following from a cost-oriented model are insensitive to the temporal 
allocation of payments within a period, a cash flow-oriented approach directly considers the 
impact of the time period on the value of the investment (Hofmann, 1998). Thus, even though 
the average cost (AC) approach has more frequently been used for studying production and 
inventory control systems than the superior net present value (NPV) approach, the 
approximation through the use of the AC model is not correct; for this reason, we use the 
annuity streams (AS) concept in this paper, i.e. we assume that a constant flow of payments 
yields the same net present value for a given stream of payments. For an infinite planning 
horizon, the AS is obtained as a linear transformation of the NPV, which quite generally can 
be viewed to be the Laplace transformation of a cash-flow function (Grubbström, 1980). 
 
The following section develops formal models to study the problem described above. In 
developing the models, the following scenarios will be considered: 
 
 Scenario 0, which assumes that no investment opportunity exists. Scenario 0, therefore, is 
a basic joint economic lot size model that serves as a benchmark case in this paper; 
 Scenario 1, which assumes that the vendor has the option to invest in its production rate, 
with the success of the investment being uncertain;  
 Scenario 2, which considers the investment option at the vendor and a settled interest rate 
for the capital loan between the vendor and the buyer. 
The three scenarios outlined above will be discussed in the following. 
 
Notation and assumptions 
The following notation will be used throughout the paper: 
𝛼 parameter of the Beta distribution 
A ordering cost per order for the buyer 
𝛽 parameter of the Beta distribution 
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b price-sensitivity of the demand rate 
c unit production cost of the vendor  
𝛿 incremental investment cost for increasing the production rate 
d fixed annual customer demand 
𝛾 incremental unit cost reduction for an increased production rate 
iB continuous interest rate on loans for the buyer 
iV continuous interest rate on loans for the vendor 
iS continuous interest rate settled between the vendor and the buyer 
K capital invested for increasing the production rate 
n number of shipments from the vendor to the buyer 
mV profit margin of the vendor 
mB profit margin of the buyer 
ϕ success probability of the investment 
p unit selling price of the buyer 
P production rate of the vendor with 𝑃 ∈ [𝑃𝑚𝑖𝑛, 𝑃𝑚𝑎𝑥] 
Q order lot size of the buyer 
𝑟 continuous discounting rate 
𝜌𝑉 interest rate coefficient for the vendor 
𝜌𝐵 interest rate coefficient for the buyer 
S setup cost for the vendor 
 
In addition to the properties already described, the following assumptions are made: 
1. The inventory system involves a single item and has an infinite planning horizon. 
2. Shortages are not allowed, as both lead time and customer demand are deterministic.  
3. The demand rate D is assumed to be a linear function of the selling price, (see Banker et 
al., 1998; Savaskan et al., 2004; Glock and Kim, 2015), p = 1+mV( ) 1+mB( )c , i.e. 
D p( ) = d -bp . The condition p < d b  has to be satisfied to ensure that demand is always 
positive. It should be noted that for Scenario 0, where the investment option is not 
considered, c = c0, p = p0 and D=D0. 
4. The vendor's production rate P is finite with P ³D. Due to technological constraints of 
the production process, it is limited to the interval [Pmin, Pmax], but may be increased at an 
investment K(P). Investments are assumed to follow a logarithmic function 
K P( ) =d ln P Pmin( )  "PÎ Pmin,Pmax[ ]  (see, e.g., Porteus, 1985). 
5. Beside the continuous capital cost according to the interest on borrowings, the investment 
in increased production capacities also induces economies of scale. Thus, an increasing 
production rate leads to reduced unit production cost according to the logarithmic 
relationship P-Pmin =g ln c0 c( )  (see Christensen et al., 1973). Thus the unit production 
cost is c P( ) = c0e
- P-Pmin( ) g . 
6. In addition, the outcome of potential productivity investments is uncertain, and the 
realized production rate is affected by the success probability of the investment, ϕ. 
7. The interest rates charged by the credit institution to the vendor and the buyer are 
assumed to depend on their solvency, which is represented by the two coefficients rV  
and rB  that describe the relationship between the average discounting rate r and the 
respective interest rate on loans, i.e. iV = rVr  and iB = rBr. 
 
Supply chain annuity stream without investment (Scenario 0) 
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The annuity stream of the vendor is given by the sum of all relevant payments according to 
their time of occurrence (Grubbström, 1980). In this scenario, which considers a basic joint 
economic lot size model without investments to increase the production rate, and which 
serves as a benchmark case, the vendor produces at the lower bound of his/her productivity 
and, thus, P is constant and equal to Pmin. The annuity stream in this case only encompasses 
sales revenues from selling batches to the buyer less the total cost consisting of setup and 
production costs, and it amounts to: 
 
AS0
V Q,n( ) =
r
1- e-rnQ/D0
1+mV( )c0Q e
-r
Q
Pmin
+ j-1( )
Q
D0
æ
è
ç
ö
ø
÷
j=1
n
å - S - c0Pmin
1- e-rnQ/Pmin
r
æ
è
ç
ç
ö
ø
÷
÷
 (1) 
 
For the buyer, the annuity stream consists of sales revenues reduced by ordering and supply 
costs: 
 
AS0
B Q,n( ) = 1+mB( ) 1+mV( )c0D0 -
r
1- e-rnQ/D0
A+ 1+mV( )c0Q( ) e
-r
Q
Pmin
+ j-1( )
Q
D0
æ
è
ç
ö
ø
÷
j=1
n
å
æ
è
ç
ç
ö
ø
÷
÷
 (2) 
 
Assuming that the vendor and the buyer cooperate by determining a jointly optimal inventory 
policy, the annuity stream of the supply chain is given by the sum of Eqs. (1) and (2): 
 
AS0
S Q,n( ) = 1+mB( ) 1+mV( )c0D0 -
r
1- e-rnQ/D0
A e
-r
Q
Pmin
+ j-1( )
Q
D0
æ
è
ç
ö
ø
÷
j=1
n
å + S+ c0Pmin
1- e-rnQ/Pmin
r
æ
è
ç
ç
ö
ø
÷
÷
 (3) 
 
In this setting, all decision variables are determined jointly to maximize the annuity stream of 
the supply chain. Using for illustrative purpose a first order Maclaurin expansion of the 
exponential components in Eq. (3), truncated at the second term, the annuity stream of the 
supply chain may be approximated (cf. Grubbström, 1980) by: 
 
 (4) 
 
The approximated formulation in Eq. (4) represents a useful reference to solve the presented 
model.  
 
Supply chain annuity stream with investment (Scenario 1 and 2) 
In the other scenarios, the annuity stream of the vendor consists of the revenues from selling 
the product to the buyer, reduced by the total cost consisting of setup, production and 
investment costs. In contrast to the previous model, the production rate of the vendor may 
now be influenced by equipment investments that enable the vendor to reduce the unit 
production cost. Moreover, it is assumed that investments in an increased production rate are 
uncertain and may not necessarily lead to the expected outcome. Accordingly, the success 
probability of the investment ϕ is a random variable that follows a beta distribution with 
mean m =a a +b( )  and variance s =ab a +b( )
2
a +b +1( ) . As the success of the 
investment is uncertain, the increase in productivity and thus the realized production rate after 
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the investment becomes uncertain as well. In consequence, the expected production rate is 
given as:  
 
E P[ ] = Pmin + P-Pmin( )E f[ ] = Pmin +a P-Pmin( ) a+b( )  (5) 
 
Note that in case of a fully successful investment,   PPE  , while in the case of a complete 
failure of the investment,   minPPE  . 
 
Thus, in Scenario 1, considering the opportunity of an uncertain investment in an increased 
production rate, the annuity streams of the vendor and the buyer are given as: 
 
AS1
V Q,n,P( ) =
r
1- e
-rnQ/D E P[ ]( )
1+mV( )c E[P]( )Q e
-r
Q
E[P]
+ j-1( )
Q
D E[P]( )
æ
è
ç
ç
ö
ø
÷
÷
j=1
n
å - S - c E[P]( )
1- e-rnQ/E[P]
r
æ
è
ç
ç
ö
ø
÷
÷
- iVK P( ) (6) 
AS1
B Q,n,P( ) = 1+mB( ) 1+mV( )c E[P]( )D E[P]( )-
r
1- e
-rnQ/D E[P]( )
A+ 1+mV( )c E[P]( )Q( ) e
-r
Q
E[P]
+ j-1( )
Q
D E[P]( )
æ
è
ç
ç
ö
ø
÷
÷
j=1
n
å
æ
è
ç
ç
ö
ø
÷
÷
 (7) 
 
Where 𝐷(𝐸[𝑃])denotes the price-dependent demand based on the unit production cost 
𝑐(𝐸[𝑃]) = 𝑐0𝑒
−(𝐸[𝑃]−𝑃𝑚𝑖𝑛)/𝛾  and the profit margin, and 𝐾(𝑃)  the vendor’s investment 
function. 
 
Assuming that the vendor and the buyer cooperate by determining a jointly optimal inventory 
policy, the annuity stream of the supply chain is given by the sum of Eqs. (6) and (7): 
 
AS1
S Q,n,P( ) = 1+mB( ) 1+mV( )c E[P]( )D E[P]( )-
r
1- e
-rnQ/D E[P]( )
A e
-r
Q
E[P]
+ j-1( )
Q
D E[P]( )
æ
è
ç
ç
ö
ø
÷
÷
j=1
n
å + S + c E[P]( )E[P]
1- e-rnQ/E[P]
r
æ
è
ç
ç
ö
ø
÷
÷
- iVK P( )
 
(8) 
 
Using for illustrative purposes a first order Maclaurin expansion of the exponential 
components in Eq. (8), truncated at the second term, the annuity stream of the supply chain 
for Scenario 1 can be approximated by: 
 
 
(9) 
 
Scenario 2 assumes that the buyer provides the necessary capital to the vendor at an interest 
rate 𝑖𝑆 that is in-between the two individual interest rates 𝑖𝑉 and 𝑖𝐵, with the aim of sharing 
the potential advantageous productivity investment at the vendor side. As the buyer has better 
access to capital from financial institutions than the vendor, he/she is able to realize a profit 
of    PKii BS   as long as the interest rate he/she has to pay is smaller than the credit 
conditions he/she offers to the vendor. In this case, the vendor’s capital expenses reduce to 
 PKiS . Assuming that the vendor and the buyer jointly determine the optimal inventory 
policy, the overall capital expense is equal to  PKiB , and the supply chain annuity stream 
becomes: 
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AS2
S Q,n,P( ) = 1+mB( ) 1+mV( )c E[P]( )D E[P]( )-
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(10) 
 
Using for illustrative purposes a first order Maclaurin expansion of the exponential 
components in Eq. (10), truncated at the second term, the annuity stream of the supply chain 
for Scenario 2 can be approximated by: 
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In the given scenarios, all decision variables are determined jointly to maximize the annuity 
stream of the supply chain. Since the objective functions (3), (8) and (10) are too complex to 
derive closed-form expressions for any of the decision variables, numerical procedures are 
required to derive a solution for the given setting. 
 
However, by using the approximated annuity stream functions, it can be shown that the 
annuity stream of the supply chain given in Eq. (4) is concave in Q for fixed values of n and 
P. Given the condition that 𝑐0 > 𝑟𝐴((𝑛 − 1) 2𝐷⁄ + 1 𝑃𝑚𝑖𝑛⁄ ), it is possible to derive a closed-
form expression for the optimal lot size: 
 
 
(12) 
 
Similarly, by using the approximated annuity stream functions, it can be shown that the 
annuity stream of the supply chain given in Eq. (9) or Eq. (11) is concave in Q for fixed 
values of n and P. Given the condition that 𝑐(𝐸[𝑃]) > 𝑟𝐴((𝑛 − 1) 2𝐷(𝐸[𝑃])⁄ +
(𝛼 + 𝛽) (𝛼𝑃 + 𝛽𝑃𝑚𝑖𝑛)⁄ ), it is possible to derive a closed-form expression for the optimal lot 
size: 
 
 
(13) 
 
To derive good, but not necessarily optimal, solutions, these expressions can be used to 
develop two-dimensional line search algorithms for finding appropriate values of n and P (cf. 
Glock, 2010). In the numerical examples, we compared the results from exact and 
approximated annuity stream functions and performed a sensitivity analyses with the exact 
functions to minimize deviations from the optimal solution. The presented problem was 
solved in Microsoft Excel enhanced with Visual Basic Codes. 
 
Numerical Analysis 
 11 
This section presents numerical examples to illustrate the behavior of the models developed 
above. We first introduce a set of parameters to define a base scenario, and then vary 
important model parameters to study how a) the opportunity to invest influences the annuity 
stream of the supply chain, b) the interest rate the vendor and the buyer agree upon influences 
the allocation of the supply chain’s annuity stream among both actors, c) the investment 
uncertainty influences the performance of the supply chain, and d) the discount rate impacts 
the investment behavior of the supply chain. 
Consider a vendor-buyer system with the following parameters: A = €100/order, b=10, c0 = 
€30/unit, γ = 8000, δ = 2000, d = 1000 units/year, iS= 0.14, mv = 0.5, mB = 0.5, Pmin = 1000 
units/year, Pmax = 6000 units/year, ρv = 2.5, ρb = 1, r = 0.08 and S = €400/setup. Moreover, for 
the investment opportunity, we assumed that the probability of success of the investment is 
modeled using a Beta distribution with parameters 2) (8,=) ,(  . 
Considering the inventory and investment decisions for the given scenarios shown in the 
previous section, Table 1 illustrates the numerical comparison between the exact equations 
and the approximated ones. As can be seen, the deviation regarding the value of the supply 
chain annuity stream is acceptable and the highest deviation of about 1.42% was observed in 
Scenario 0. However, in every scenario, the approximations lead to systematically lower 
order quantities especially in the case without investments. 
 
 Scenario 0 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
[units] Q0
* = 445.05  Q1
* = 546.53  Q2
* = 558.48  
[shipm
ent] 
n0 =1  n1 =1 
 n2 =1 
 
[€/unit
] 
c0 = 30   c1 = 23.21 
 c2 = 22.66 
 
[€/unit
] 
p0 = 67.50   p1 = 52.22  
 p2 = 50.97  
 
[unit] D0 = 325  D1 = 477.78 
 D2 = 490.25 
 
[units] Pmin =1000 Pmin =1000 P1 = 3566.15 
 P2 = 3807.97 
 
[€] K P( )0 =-
  K P( )
1
= 2,542.97  K P( )
2
= 2,674.19  
[€] AS0
S =11,441.99   AS1
S =12,464.31  AS2
S =12,777.52   
Table 1. Comparison between exact (results in the left column for each scenario) and 
approximated formulation (results in the right column for each scenario 
 
As can be seen, the opportunity to invest in increasing the production rate leads to a 
significant increase in the annuity stream for the supply chain (cf. a shift from Scenario 0 to 
Scenario 1). Moreover, considering the opportunity of a contractually agreed interest rate 
between the actors of the supply chain (cf. a shift from Scenario 1 to Scenario 2), the supply 
chain benefits from an additional increase in the annuity stream due to the reduced interest 
expenses.  
 
It should be noted that the agreed interest rate iS is not necessarily fixed; instead, depending 
on the bargaining power of the two players and on the willingness of the stronger to help the 
weaker, it would adopt a value between the two individual interest rates iV and iB. As can be 
seen in Figure 2, higher interest rates settled by the actors increase the vendor’s total cost and 
decrease its annuity stream in Scenario 2, while it has no effect in Scenario 1. Thus, the 
increase in the annuity stream that occurs when shifting from Scenario 1 to Scenario 2, for 
higher iS, is reduced. For the buyer, in contrast, the opposite effect can be observed: higher 
settled interest rates decrease its total cost and increase its annuity stream in Scenario 2. As 
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the total cost and total annuity stream are independent of the agreed-upon interest rate in the 
integrated scenario, varying interest rates merely affect the allocation of the cooperation gain. 
Figure 2 – Variation of the annuity streams of the actors for varying interest rates from 
Scenario 1 to Scenario 2 
Furthermore, the value of the annuity stream considered in Scenarios 1 and 2 is an expected 
value, which depends on the Beta distribution. Thus, it is necessary to analyze the probability 
distribution of the supply chain’s annuity stream in order to evaluate the dispersion of the 
results around the mean value. Figure 3 illustrates the probability distribution of the supply 
chain’s annuity stream in Scenario 2. In this paper, uncertainty, represented by the probability 
distribution of the investment success, is modelled using a Monte Carlo simulation 
implemented as an add-in module in Microsoft Excel @Risk. 
 
  
Figure 3 - Probability density function of the supply chain’s annuity stream in Scenario 2  
An interesting indicator for the prospects of success of the risky investment is the probability 
that the annuity stream of Scenario 2 exceeds the one of Scenario 0, i.e. the part of the area 
under the probability density function representing the distribution of AS2
S for values larger 
than AS0  (according to Figure 3): P(AS2
S > AS0
S )= P(AS2
S >11, 441.99€ ) . In the given 
example, it is possible to observe that the annuity stream in Scenario 2 is larger than the one 
of Scenario 0 with a probability close to 100% (see Figure 3). Thus, the investment with a 
settled interest rate between the vendor and the buyer will lead to better results than the 
benchmark case without investment at a very high probability. 
To observe the behavior of the supply chain’s annuity stream for all scenarios and for varying 
discount rates, a sensitivity analysis was performed, and the results are reported in Figure 4 
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(parts a to d). The main results show that a higher discount rate r increases the total costs of 
both actors and decreases their annuity stream and the investments made (Figure 4a-b). 
Moreover, it is possible to observe that Scenario 2 leads to a higher annuity stream and a 
higher capital invested than the other two scenarios as the settled interest rate leads to a more 
efficient capital expenditure in this case. Figure 4c shows the effect on the annuity stream of 
the supply chain that result from a shift from Scenario 0 to Scenario 1 (ΔASS1-0) and from 
Scenario 1 to Scenario 2 (ΔASS2-1): for higher values of r, the change of the supply chain 
annuity stream introduced with the investment, in a situation of individual decision-making, 
is less significant, while the settled interest rate between the vendor and the buyer assumes 
greater relevance. Figure 4d illustrates the variation of the annuity stream for a shift from 
Scenario 0 to 1 and from Scenario 1 to 2 for higher opportunity cost for buyer and vendor. 
The increase of the discount rate for the buyer decreases its annuity stream, while considering 
the option of an investment (i.e. shifting from Scenario 0 to 1) and when the settled interest 
rate is considered (i.e., from Scenario 1 to 2). For the vendor, the behavior is different: while 
the discount rate increases, its annuity stream decreases while considering the option of 
investment (i.e. from Scenario 0 to 1); in contrast, it increases if additionally the settled 
interest rate is considered as an additional option (i.e. from Scenario 1 to 2). 
 
 
a) 
 
 
b) 
 
c) 
 
d) 
Figure 4(a-d)- Influence of the discount rate 𝑟 on the annuity streams of the vendor and the 
buyer 
 
Another sensitivity analysis was performed for the expected success probability of the 
investment (note that this was only performed for the scenarios with investment, i.e. 
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Scenarios 1 and 2). Figure 5 illustrates the results for different α-parameter value and, thus, 
expected success probabilities (i.e. higher α-parameter corresponds to higher success 
probability) and shows that a greater probability of success for the investment in an increased 
production rate leads to a higher supply chain annuity stream (Figure 5a), less capital 
invested in both scenarios (Figure 5b), and a higher variation of the supply chain’s annuity 
stream generated by the investment option. In addition, the profit introduced by the settled 
interest rate slightly decreases (Figure 5c). Moreover, the scenario with the settled interest 
rate leads to a higher supply chain annuity stream and to a higher capital investment. 
   
  
a) b) 
 
c) 
Figure 5(a-c)- Influence of the α-parameter of the beta distribution on the annuity streams and 
the investment 
 
Subsequently, additional sensitivity analyses were performed to evaluate the changes in the 
numerical solutions for alternative ratios of the interest rate coefficients of the two actors, 
which leads to the following results: a higher ratio of the interest rate coefficient of the buyer 
to the one of the vendor, which implies a lower difference between the capital loan conditions 
of the two actors, leads to a reduction in the annuity stream of the buyer and the entire supply 
chain, as the investment becomes less attractive for the buyer. For the vendor, the annuity 
stream increases (Figure 6). 
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Figure 6 - Sensitivity analysis for the annuity streams of both actors in the ratio of the capital 
cost coefficient of the two actors (Scenario 2) 
 
The models proposed in this paper can also be used to estimate the investment required to 
achieve a given increase in the annuity stream, x. For this purpose, we consider an integrated 
decision with financing agreement (Scenario 2), and as a base case the scenario with 
integrated decisions without investment and financing agreement (Scenario 0). Thus, the 
variation of the annuity stream is given by DAS = E AS2
Sé
ë
ù
û-AS0
S( ) AS0S . This can be achieved by 
considering a further constraint in the numerical optimization problem as follows:  
DAS ³ x  (14) 
It should be noted that in case the targeted increase in the annuity stream cannot be reached 
by the investment, the problem may become infeasible. 
For illustrative purposes, starting from the numerical example reported at the beginning of 
this section, and imposing an expected annuity stream increase of %5x , we obtain the 
solution reported in Table 2: 
 
 Scenario 0 Scenario 2 
[units] Q0
* = 445.05 Q2
* = 445.28 
[shipment
] 
n0 =1 n2 =1 
[€/unit] c0 = 30  c2 = 28.13 
[€/unit] p0 = 67.50  p2 = 63.29  
[unit] D0 = 325 D2 = 367.04 
[units] Pmin =1000 P2 =1643.02  
[€] K P( )
0
=- K P( )
2
= 993.07  
[€] AS0
V = 4,479.53 AS2
V = 4,680.88 
[%] - DAS0-2
V = 4.50% 
[€] AS0
B = 6,962.46  AS2
B = 7,333.21 
[%] - DAS0-2
B = 5.32% 
[€] AS0
S =11,441.99  AS2
S =12,014.10  
[%] - DAS0-2
S = 5% 
Table 2 - Numerical results for the models developed in this paper for the case of a minimum 
growth target for the annuity stream 
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As illustrated in Table 2, it is possible to reach an increment of 5% of the annuity stream of 
the supply chain with respect to the benchmark scenario (Scenario 0), with a low investment 
in the production rate, while the other decision variables are affected only slightly. 
 
Conclusions 
The key contribution of the present work is the evaluation of an uncertain investment 
opportunity. This paper presented a supply chain inventory model where the buyer, for 
different reasons (e.g. dimension, location, bank agreements, etc.), has access to capital at a 
lower interest rate than its vendor. Therefore, the buyer has the option to invest in improving 
its vendor’s productivity either directly or indirectly by lending him/her capital. The 
investment aimed at increasing the production rate of the vendor was assumed uncertain in 
this paper, such that the probability of a successful investment can be smaller than 1. The 
probability of success has been modeled using a beta distribution. 
The models developed in this paper considers different scenarios, namely integrated decisions 
without investments, integrated decisions with investment option at the vendor side, and 
integrated decisions with the investment option and a settled interest rate for the capital loan 
between the vendor and the buyer. These models aim at evaluating the efficiency of 
collaboration between the members of the supply chain, and at determining optimal 
investment levels for different success probabilities of the investment. The present study 
illustrates that in case investment opportunities exist, closely coordinating the investment and 
inventory replenishment activities, and considering the option to share the cost of the 
investment, help to improve the performance of the entire supply chain. 
 
The paper showed that limited access to credit and the linked worst credit condition (i.e. 
higher interest rate for bank loans for the investments) at the vendor’s side induce strong 
asymmetry in the supply chain. Thus, considering a centralized scenario with joint decision-
making and a settled interest rate for the capital loan between the vendor and the buyer, it is 
possible to obtain a benefit for the entire chain. Based on the results of our numerical analysis, 
we conclude that a partnership agreement on sharing financial resources between supply 
chain members may help to overcome the potential skepticism of uncertain investments. 
 
A possible extension of the present work is to consider efficient profit sharing mechanisms 
that induce cooperation between different members of the supply chain even under 
decentralized decision making. In a decentralized setting, it is necessary to establish 
incentives for cooperation, for example when one of the actors of the supply chain undergoes 
a reduction in profits. As was shown by Arshinder et al. (2008), the dependencies between 
supply chain members can be managed with different means and mechanisms of coordination 
and by utilizing these mechanisms, the performance of the whole supply chain can be 
improved. Considering such incentive mechanisms might be a valuable extension of the 
presented approach. The supply chain members could, for example, adjust their terms of trade 
via a contract that establishes a transfer payment scheme, e.g. in a profit or revenue sharing 
contract (Chen, 2012; Cachon, 2003). By using such a contract, none of the participants 
would have an incentive to deviate from the optimal supply chain decisions and actions 
(Govindan, et al., 2013). Some examples of profit sharing mechanisms are found in Govindan 
et al. (2013), Cachon (2003), Jaber and Osman (2006), and Jaber et al. (2006). Apart from 
inventive mechanisms, it would be interesting to analyze alternative methods of investment 
financing (e.g. loan, leasing, mortgage, etc.). Finally, developing an integrated model that 
considers different investment types simultaneously would also be interesting. 
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